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Est. of Curtis v. S. Las Vegas Med. Inv’rs, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 39 (July 9, 2020)1 
 
TORT LAW: NEGLIGENCE, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE, COMMON KNOWLEDGE 
EXCEPTION TO MEDICAL EXPERT AFFIDAVIT REQUIREMENT 
 
Summary 
 The Court applied the common knowledge exception to the expert affidavit requirement 
for an ordinary negligence claim that appeared to sound in professional negligence. The Court 
determined that a claim predicated upon ordinary negligence—such that a lay juror would not 
require medical expert testimony to evaluate—is excused from NRS 41A.071’s medical expert 
affidavit requirement.2 Here, an act such as administering medicine to the wrong patient is ordinary 
negligence rather than professional negligence. 
 The Court affirmed the expert testimony requirement for allegations that challenged the 
health care provider’s medical judgment. Here, allegations of failing to monitor a patient sounded 
in professional negligence and required expert testimony to evaluate. Therefore, this allegation 
was not excused from the medical expert affidavit requirement. 
 
Background 
 Nurse Dawson, a licensed nurse working for Life Care Center of South Las Vegas (“LCC”) 
accidentally administered morphine, prescribed to another patient, to decedent, Ms. Curtis. At the 
direction of a physician, Nurse Dawson administered Narcan to Curtis to counteract the morphine. 
LCC monitored Curtis until 5pm that day. Curtis was found unresponsive at 11am the next day. 
Curtis passed away three days later due to morphine intoxication. 
 Curtis’s Estate (“The Estate”) sued LCC alleging that its mismanagement caused Nurse 
Dawson to administer the wrong medication and fail to monitor or treat Curtis, leading to Curtis’s 
death.  
 The district court granted LCC’s motion for summary judgment finding the gravamen of 
the allegations sounded in professional negligence and required an expert affidavit to be filed along 
with the complaint per NRS 41A.071.3 
  
Discussion 
 In Nevada, professional negligence is the failure of a health care provider, such as a nurse, 
to use reasonable care, skill, or knowledge used by like professionals in similar situations on the 
job.4 The court is required to dismiss a claim without a supporting medical affidavit for 
professional negligence against a health care provider.5 The purpose of the requirement is for 
economic efficiency and to reduce suits lacking merit or a competent, good faith basis.  
 
 
 
 
 
1  By Allison Mann 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.071 (2020). 
3  Id. 
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.015 (2020). 
5  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.071 (2020). 
Direct liability claims against a nursing home facility do not excuse compliance with NRS 
41A.071’s affidavit requirement  
 
 The Estate argued a supporting medical expert affidavit was not required for their particular 
allegations because the Estate alleged only ordinary negligence claims against LCC. The Estate 
argued LCC’s managerial decisions were the direct cause of Curtis’s death, and not professional 
negligence on the part of Nurse Dawson. 
 The Court disagreed with the Estate’s arguments. The Court stated that where the facts of 
an ordinary negligent hiring, supervision, or training claim are necessarily linked to professional 
negligence, then that ordinary negligence claim should be categorized as vicarious liability and 
not a separate tort. The Court emphasized ordinary negligence claims shall not be used to evade 
the supporting medical affidavit requirements of professional negligence claims when such claims 
clearly sound in professional negligence.  
 The Estate’s claims were necessarily connected to the underlying professional negligence 
and was therefore required to accompany the claim with a supporting medical affidavit.  
 
Whether the allegations in the complaint sound in ordinary negligence or professional 
negligence 
 
 A claim sounds in professional negligence if it involves “medical diagnosis, judgment, or 
treatment.”6 If a jury requires a medical expert to explain the appropriate standards of care to 
evaluate a claim, then the claim is one of professional negligence. However, if jurors are able to 
use common knowledge to evaluate the nonmedical services provided by a healthcare worker, then 
the claim is likely ordinary negligence.  
 The Court recognized the common knowledge exception’s narrow applicability to 
professional negligence claims not involving professional judgment. The common knowledge 
exception applies in situations where negligence is obvious to a lay juror without expert testimony. 
Such a claim will not be subject to Nevada’s expert affidavit requirement.  
 The Estate’s complaint against LCC was based on two underlying allegations: (1) Nurse 
Dawson administered the wrong medication to Curtis and (2) LCC did not thereafter appropriately 
monitor or care for Curtis. The Court concluded that the first allegation sounded in ordinary 
negligence while the latter was professional negligence. 
 
Nurse Dawson administering morphine to Curtis is a matter of ordinary negligence 
 
 The threshold issue was whether Nurse Dawson’s negligence in administering the wrong 
medication to Curtis constituted professional negligence and therefore triggered the expert 
affidavit requirement. The Court concluded Nurse Dawson was not required to use her professional 
judgment when she administered the wrong medication. 
 Even though administering medicine constituted medical treatment, the prescribing 
physician was the one who used professional judgment to ascertain what medication Curtis 
required. The claim that Nurse Dawson administered the wrong medication to Curtis required no 
expert testimony to evaluate and was therefore ordinary negligence.  
 
6  See Szymborski v. Spring Mountain Treatment Ctr., 133 Nev. 638, 641, 403 P.3d 1280, 1284 (2017). 
 The Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the Estate’s ordinary negligence claim 
based upon the Nurse’s administration of the wrong medication to Curtis because the Court found 
this claim was not subject to the expert affidavit requirement. 
 
LCC’s failure to monitor Curtis is a matter of professional negligence 
 
 Another issue was whether the allegation that the facility failed to monitor Curtis was a 
professional negligence allegation. The Court concluded that it was.  
 The allegations could not be evaluated by a lay juror based merely on common knowledge. 
The allegations of failure to properly monitor Curtis entailed decisions requiring professional 
judgment. Here, expert testimony was vital to aid the jurors in evaluating the decision to prescribe 
Narcan, LCC’s decision not to transfer Curtis to the hospital, and the decision of how and when to 
monitor Curtis after the accidental morphine administration.  
 Because the allegations were a matter of professional negligence, the Court affirmed 
summary judgment by the district court concerning the failure-to-monitor allegation. 
 
Res ipsa loquitur does not relieve the Estate of its duty to file an expert affidavit 
 
 The Estate’s alternative argument claimed their allegations fell within the res ipsa loquitur 
exception to the expert affidavit requirement. The res ipsa loquitur exception at issue applies 
where, during treatment, a part of the body not involved in the treatment was injured.7 
 The Estate’s claim however did not fit within the exception because Curtis did not suffer 
injury to a distinct part of the body not addressed in the treatment. Here, the treatment in and of 
itself was the injury. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply. 
 
Conclusion 
 Accidental administration of medicine to the wrong patient was ordinary negligence, 
readily apparent to a lay juror without expert testimony. Under the common knowledge exception, 
readily apparent, ordinary negligence claims were not subject to a medical expert affidavit 
requirement. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this allegation 
and the Court reversed in part. 
 A medical affidavit was required under NRS 41A.071 where allegations challenge a health 
care provider’s professional judgment. The district court correctly granted summary judgment as 
to the professional negligence allegation and the Court affirmed in part. The matter was remanded 
to the district court for further proceedings. 
 
 
7  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.100(1)(d) (2020). 
